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Abstract
Budget procedures are often adopted or changed to improve “transparency” in
budgeting. This phrase can refer to two different, although related, stages of the budget
process. First, transparency may refer to the outputs of budgeting; here the ideal is that
the tradeoffs inherent in a budget should be made clear, salient and understandable to
policy makers and the public. Second, transparency may refer to the inputs of budgeting;
here the ideal is to ensure that the decision-making process is itself conducted in public.
This paper focuses on the second concept of budget transparency—the degree to which
important budgeting decisions are made in public and in open deliberation and debate.
We identify an ideal transparency regime for the federal budget process, one that
optimizes the benefits and costs of transparency and opacity. Two institutional-design
tradeoffs are critical. First, transparency allows the public, and others who bring
information to the attention of the public such as the media and challengers, to monitor
elected officials and hold them accountable. However, it also allows interest groups,
whose interests may not be congruent with the larger public interest, to monitor
legislators. Because interest groups are better organized than the public, transparency
may unduly empower those representing minority interests at the expense of overall
welfare. We propose some techniques of transparency—such as delayed disclosure,
which provides information some period of time after the budgeting decision has been
made—that empower the voters while reducing the ability of interest groups to influence
outcomes. Second, we discuss the effect of transparency on legislative arguing and
legislative bargaining. Transparency deters self-interested bargains, but can also
encourage posturing and inflexibility that produces bad deliberation. We propose that
opacity is generally beneficial at earlier stages of the budget process, as where
committees develop the macro-level allocations embodied in the concurrent budget
resolution, while transparency is desirable at later stages of the process, when committees
engage in concrete bargaining.
Finally, we discuss various institutional constraints and second-best problems at
the implementation stage, including the question whether politics will block adoption of
the optimal transparency framework, the risk that transparency will be circumvented by
collusion, and the risk that opacity will be undermined by leaks. Although these problems
are serious, we conclude that none is insuperable.
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Transparency in the U.S. Budget Process
Elizabeth Garrett* & Adrian Vermeule**

The notion of “transparency” in government is very much in vogue both in the
United States and worldwide, particularly in the arena of fiscal policy. The emphasis on
openness is sensible because transparency serves crucial objectives in democracies.
Transparency can promote public-spirited behavior by constraining bargaining based on
self-interest, promoting principled deliberation instead. Even where self-interest is
universal, providing information to principals about the action of their agents—here,
elected officials—reduces the costs of monitoring, thereby promising to improve
governance in a representative democracy.
However, the word “transparency” is often used imprecisely to refer to a number
of characteristics of an open system without much independent analysis of each aspect.
Moreover, adherents to transparency are often insufficiently inattentive to the costs of
disclosure. Transparency is sometimes in tension with other important democratic values
and may even, in some cases, be self-defeating. The unconditional embrace of
transparency lies in the power of the word itself—it connotes the opposite of secrecy and
skullduggery, putting those who would argue for a tempering of openness in a difficult
*
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rhetorical position. This is unfortunate: it diminishes the willingness of many who study
transparency to forthrightly consider the costs as well as the benefits.1
In this paper, we propose to focus on one aspect of transparency in the federal
budget process: requirements that deliberation and bargaining over budget policy occur
publicly. There are several distinct arenas of budget policymaking; currently, each
displays a slightly different mix of opacity and transparency. The arenas include decision
making purely within the executive branch; policy recommendations by federal advisory
committees; the legislative process including committee consideration, floor deliberation
and conference committee decisions; and interbranch decision making in occasional
budget summits. In each arena, there is a mixture of openness and secrecy; political
players find private space for some deliberation, even in the face of aggressive open
meeting requirements, by taking advantage of gaps in any rules or statutes.
Is the current mix optimal, or at least the best that can be achieved given political
constraints? Even without legal requirements for transparency, there would be a certain
amount of openness in decision making because some publicity is in the agentlawmakers’ interest.2 However, there is no reason to believe that the degree of
transparency reached by political actors on their own would necessarily be optimal from
society’s point of view. Self-interested agents also have incentives to keep secret some
aspects of budgeting that their principals would be eager to monitor—namely, the use of
budgets to provide benefits to well-funded and well-organized special interests that will
reward lawmakers with campaign funds.3 It is hardly obvious that the status quo, where
1

See James T. O’Reilly, “Access to Records” Versus “Access to Evil”: Should Disclosure Laws Consider
Motives as a Barrier to Records Release?, 12 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 559, 559-60 (2003) (discussing
emphasis on ever-increasing transparency in laws regulating government). For a recent exception to this
tendency, see Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 277 (2004) (assessing costs and
benefits of disclosure in the federal regulatory context).
2
See John Ferejohn, Accountability and Authority: Toward a Theory of Political Accountability, in
Democracy, Accountability and Representation 131 (A. Przeworski, S.C. Stokes & B. Manin eds. 1999).
Note, however, that the only extant test of this model reaches inconclusive results. See James E. Alt, Three
Simple Tests of Ferejohn’s Model: Transparency and Accountability in US States 2005 (paper prepared for
NYU Colloquium on Law, Economics and Politics).
3
See Alberto Alesina & Roberto Perotti, Fiscal Discipline and the Budget Process, 86 Am. Econ. Rev.
401, 403 (1996) (noting that “politicians do not have an incentive to adopt the most transparent practices”
because they want to maintain their informational advantage). Ferejohn’s work suggesting that legislative
agents have incentives toward some amount of transparency to allow audit of their activities by principals
does not suggest that these incentives will produce the optimal mix of transparency and opacity, but that
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some deliberation occurs in secrecy notwithstanding open meeting requirements,
maximizes the benefits of transparency while minimizing its costs.
Our principal aim is to propose an optimal transparency scheme for the federal
budget process; however, we also consider institutional and political constraints on
attaining that scheme. Section I provides a brief overview of transparency in the federal
budget process, as it is currently structured. We then offer a two-stage analysis. In
Section II, we address the optimal or first-best structure of transparency in the budget
process, as though that structure could be imposed by an impartial designer of political
institutions. We identify crucial tradeoffs that determine the costs and benefits of
transparency. One tradeoff is that secrecy promotes good deliberation, while transparency
deters self-interested bargaining. A second tradeoff is that transparency ensures both
accountability to voters, which is good, and also accountability to efficiency-reducing
interest groups, which is bad. In light of these tradeoffs, we sketch an optimal
transparency structure for budgeting, a structure with two crucial features. First, the early
stages of the budget process, including the formulation of a concurrent budget resolution
by budget committees, will be secret or opaque, while the later stages will be transparent.
Here the dual aim is to encourage good deliberation where that is possible and to hamper
self-interested bargaining where that is likely. Second, even for later stages of the budget
process, disclosure will be delayed, perhaps until well into the election cycle. Here the
aims are, first, to deny interest groups immediate access to the details of ongoing decision
making; and, second, to sort good from bad accountability by giving voters information
when they need it while denying information to interest groups when they want it. In
Section III, we consider institutional and political constraints that might rule out the
optimal structure. We conclude that it is an open question whether the optimal structure is
attainable, given reasonable assumptions about legislators’ motivations and relevant
constraints; there is no knockdown reason to think the structure we propose is
unattainable or infeasible.

“the agent has an interest in offsetting the effects of some of those [informational] asymmetries”). Ferejohn,
supra note 2, at 149.
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I. Transparency in the Federal Budget Process
This Section defines some terms and broadly describes the current mix of
transparency and opacity in the federal budget process.
Two Senses of “Transparency”
We focus on the transparency of the budget process, but this is only one sense of
“transparency.” The literature indiscriminately addresses both the transparency of the
process, or of the inputs into the budget, and the transparency of the output itself, or of
the budget documents produced by government officials.4 The latter concern, which
might better be labeled “intelligibility,” emphasizes the ease with which people, the
press, financial markets, and others can understand budgetary decisions reached by
policymakers. Are the tradeoffs involved adequately described? Are the economic
assumptions clearly set forth? Are the methods of accounting for expenditures and
revenues likely to provide a basis for an accurate assessment of the country’s fiscal
health? Are budgetary decisions made in one or a few documents so the entirety of the
budget can be understood? Can outside, nonpartisan experts analyze the fiscal condition
of the country on the basis of the budget documents? Indeed, much of the literature on
fiscal transparency seems more concerned with intelligibility rather than the openness of
the deliberations themselves.5
Although we will not directly assess transparency or intelligibility at the output
stage, the two aspects of transparency are related. The more transparent the output, the
more likely it is that outsiders can reason backwards to develop a sense of the inputs,
without actually witnessing the process as it occurs. In the fiscal arena, however, the
process of using the output to discover the inputs can be challenging. Budgets are
complex, so it can be difficult to separate all the strands and exceedingly difficult to trace

4

Heald also identifies transparency of outcomes, as distinct from outputs, as a relevant aspect of
transparency. Outcomes are how the budget actually links to policy: do budgetary decisions lead to
effective uses of government money? See David Heald, Fiscal Transparency: Concepts, Measurement and
UK Practice, 81 Pub. Admin. 723, 729, 731-32 (2003). Most of the literature, however, deals with either
the budget process or its output, the budget itself.
5
See, e.g., George Kopits, Transparency in Government Operations (May 2000) (paper presented at the
Interamerican Development Bank Conference on Transparency and Development in Latin America and the
Caribbean); James E. Alt, David Dreyer Lassen, & David Skilling, Fiscal Transparency, Gubernatorial
Approval, and the Scale of Government: Evidence from the States, 2 State Pol. & Pol’y Q. 230, 235-36
(2002) (providing variables relating to fiscal transparency).
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decisions back to particular actors and particular motivations. Moreover, certain outputs
can be the product of various inputs—some public-regarding, others the result of the
influence of private-regarding behavior by interest groups. Even if the outcome is
socially desirable, it may still be important in a democracy to understand whether it is the
result of particular interest group pressure brought to bear on key legislators. Finally, if
the process is open, outsiders can more easily provide helpful information as
deliberations occur. Thus, we discuss the appropriate degree of transparency that should
be accorded to budget deliberations in the context of a system where there is a substantial
degree of transparency regarding the output, but where there are nonetheless reasons to
be concerned about the openness of the decision making process.
Transparency in the Budget Process: Current Rules
There are degrees of openness in the federal budget process, varying across
different arenas of decision making. Generally, the process is an open one, particularly
when it reaches Congress. In all stages of the process, however, players can find ways to
bargain in private through informal interactions or negotiations with a subgroup of
relevant decision makers that result in a deal later made public. In this section, we will
not present a comprehensive or detailed description of the rules and laws that shape
federal budget transparency; we hope only to give a sense of the different mixes of
opacity and transparency to provide a background for our subsequent analysis.
Some of least transparent stages of the budget process are those that occur entirely
within the executive branch. Most opaque are policy discussions that take place wholly
within the executive branch among administrators, who are protected by the deliberative
process component of executive privilege. This protection from disclosure is not
absolute; for example, the D.C. Circuit has held that the Sunshine in Government Act6
requires that open meetings when multi-member agencies discuss budget matters unless
the matters fall into an exemption, narrowly construed. Budget-related discussions among
such agencies’ heads, such as a deliberation about how to react to an Office of

6

5 U.S.C. § 522b (applying only to collegial, multi-member agencies with members appointed by the
President with the advice and consent of Congress).
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Management and Budget (OMB) decision to reduce the agency’s budget request, was not
found to fall within any exemption.7
Nevertheless, many budget discussions do not take place at this level, and those
remain confidential. The White House avidly guards the privacy of this kind of policy
deliberation. In 2001, the Deputy OMB Director reminded all agency and department
heads of “the importance of continuing to preserve the confidentiality of the deliberations
that led to the President’s budget decisions.”8 This memorandum aims to protect from
disclosure documents developed before the President’s Budget has been formally
presented to Congress, and it explicitly mentions keeping confidential budget requests
sent to an agency from its component parts, the agency’s requests to OMB, and OMB’s
responses to the agency.
Once the President’s budget has been submitted to Congress, agencies and
executive branch officials share some information with members of Congress through
formal interactions like testimony and supplementary documents and also through
informal interbranch discussions among staff. The White House continues to warn
agency heads to keep confidential executive branch communications, such as agency
justifications of budget request to OMB, that were part of the internal deliberative
process, and it requires that all budget-related materials submitted to Congress be cleared
first by OMB.9 A recent opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel reiterated the position
that agency officials need clearance before releasing confidential documents protected by
the deliberative process component of executive privilege to members of Congress.10

7

National Regulatory Comm’n v. Common Cause, 674 F.2d 921 (1982). See also Federal Communication
Commission v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 471 (1984) (including within the term
“meeting” “discussions [by the agency] that effectively predetermine official actions [and are] sufficiently
focused on discrete proposals or issues as to cause or to be likely to cause the individual participating
members to form reasonably firm positions regarding matters pending or likely to arise before the
agency.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
8
Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum M-01-17, Memorandum for Heads of Executive
Departments and Agencies, Confidentiality of Pre-Decisional Budget Information (Apr. 25, 2001),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m01-17.html.
9
Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-11, Part I, § 22 (2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a11/02toc.html.
10
Letter Opinion from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel, for the General Counsel, Department of Health and Human Services, Authority of
Agency Officials to Prohibit Employees from Providing Information to Congress (May 21, 2004), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/crsmemoresponsese.htm.
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This desire to control the information sent to Congress is driven by the worry that
an agency, perhaps disappointed with its budgetary allocation made by OMB and the
President, will attempt to obtain more resources from Congress. The “unitary” executive
consists of many players, some who may not share the President’s vision of the
appropriate budget priorities, so OMB must develop mechanisms to police the President’s
agents and reduce defections from the overall policy. Not surprisingly, members of
Congress have often attempted to obtain information about executive branch budget
deliberations from officials who may hope for a more sympathetic hearing from
congressional committees; the OLC opinion was prompted by an attempt by
Representative Rangel, the ranking member on the Ways and Means Committee, to
obtain internal cost estimates from officials at the Department of Health and Human
Resources.11
The protection of executive privilege becomes murky when the executive branch
consults with people outside the administration for expertise and advice in formulating
the policy. When people other than executive branch officials play an important role in
the formulation of policy, executive privilege may cease to apply and the interactions
may become subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA).12 FACA is one of
many “sunshine in government” acts passed in the 1970s and includes broad provisions
requiring open meetings and public availability of documents.13
Once the budget reaches Congress, it is shaped by internal rules in the House and
Senate which generally require that committee hearings and meetings to transact
legislative business, including mark-ups, be conducted in open session. Although the
rules allow meetings to be closed, they limit executive sessions to circumstances where
disclosure would “endanger national security, would compromise sensitive law
enforcement information, [or] would tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any

11

Memorandum from Jack Maskell, Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service, for Honorable
Charles Rangel, House Committee on Ways and Means, Agency Prohibiting a Federal Officer from
Providing Accurate Cost Information to the United States Congress (Apr. 26, 2004) (on file with authors).
12
5 U.S.C. App. 2.
13
In practice, federal advisory committees are able to do a great deal of their work outside the public eye.
See infra text accompanying notes 53 through 61.
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person.”14 As with all internal rules, these are enforced within the body so that members
can raise points of order and other objections if they believe a meeting has been closed
contrary to the rules. All the relevant committees in the budget process—appropriations,
budget, and tax-writing committees—operate under similar open meeting requirements.15
Thus, meetings where testimony is taken or business is conducted can be closed only in
limited circumstances, such as committee meetings concerning the budget of intelligence
agencies where discussions implicate national security. In particular, committee mark-ups
and votes on legislation relating to the budget must occur in public. Similarly, House and
Senate rules require that conference committees conduct their business in open
meetings.16
Notwithstanding open meeting rules in Congress, a great deal of the bargaining
related to the federal budget occurs in private. Congressional parties discuss broad policy
issues in party caucuses that are not subject to open meeting requirements. Increasingly,
party leaders have used task forces made up of selected lawmakers—sometimes only
from the majority party—to formulate legislative proposals, some which may be
incorporated into budget reconciliation bills.17 Once the proposal goes to a committee or
the full body, the meetings to debate and amend it are open to the public, but the
preliminary work of the task force occurs largely in private and may crucially shape the
ultimate product. Even during committee deliberations and conference committee
negotiations, discussions occur between the committee leadership and individual
members, among co-partisans on the committee, between staff of members and the
committee, or in other groups of lawmakers and staff that are not considered official
“meetings” or “hearings” subject to the transparency provisions of the internal rules.
Conference committees in particular routinely hold key gatherings behind closed doors,
14

House Rule XI, cl. 2(g)(1). See also Senate Rule XXVI, para. 5(b) (providing similar reasons for
executive session with some additional justifications such as relating “solely to matters of committee staff
personnel or internal staff management”).
15
See, e.g., Rules of the House Committee on the Budget, Rule 5; Rules of the House Committee on
Appropriations, sec. 4(d)(1); Rules for the Senate Committee on Finance, Rule 2.
16
House Rule XXII, cl. 12(a)(1); Senate Rule XXVIII, para. 6.
17
These informal task forces are different from task forces appointed by some committees, e.g., Rule of the
House Committee on the Budget, Rule 12, which are the equivalent of subcommittees. For a discussion of
the use of task forces, see Elizabeth Garrett, Attention to Context in Statutory Interpretation: Applying the
Lessons of Dynamic Statutory Interpretation to Omnibus Legislation, Issues in Leg. Scholarship, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation (2002): Article 1, page 9, available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss3/art1.
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sometimes only among members of the majority party in both houses or, more frequently,
just their leaders who negotiate deals in private before the overall bargain is presented to
the whole committee in a pro forma public meeting.18
Budget deliberations on the floor of the House and Senate are public and
televised. It is highly unusual for either house to go into a closed session, and
consideration of the various budget vehicles—the concurrent budget resolution,
appropriations bills, budget reconciliation acts, and the various conference reports—are
not likely to trigger an executive session. Again, although the deliberations, amendments,
and votes are public, and constitutionally required to be memorialized in a journal of
proceedings,19 many of the key deals are made in the cloakrooms or members’ Capitol
hideaways and not made public except as they can be discerned from the provisions of
the law ultimately enacted and any public claims of responsibility from the lawmakers
involved.
Because the open meeting requirements affecting congressional committees are
contained in internal rules of the bodies or of the committees themselves, enforcement is
a purely internal matter. As long as the members are content with the mix of transparency
and opacity in the congressional budget process, no outside watchdog can challenge
either the decision to hold some meetings behind closed doors or the validity of the
legislation that emerges from the process on the basis that transparency rules were
violated. In the post-reform Congress, more of the work of committees has been done in
public, and committee hearings and mark-ups are broadly publicized through television
and other press coverage.
The force of the congressional rules is not clear, for several reasons. First,
legislative rules requiring transparency are often partially evaded by members who need
to negotiate in private. They take advantage of gaps in the rules’ coverage to discuss
important issues informally behind closed doors. However, requiring transparency in
18

See, e.g., Lewis Deschler, 16 Deschler’s Precedents of the United States House of Representatives, H.R.
Doc. No. 94-661, ch. 33 (1976). It was not until the 94th Congress that the House and Senate adopted rules
requiring that conference committee meetings be held in open session. Id. at § 5.2. However, all that is
required for a valid conference is a quorum on the signature sheet of the conference report and a public
meeting of the conferees. Id. at § 5.8. The result is that a great deal of preliminary deliberations can be held
behind closed doors.
19
U.S. Const., § 5, cl. 3.
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formal rules is a signal to the public of lawmakers’ commitment to openness and may
increase the political cost of defecting from the rules if intermediaries like the press or
challengers successfully make secret deliberations an issue for voters. Second, lawmakers
might carry out a great deal of their work in public even without rules requiring them to
do so. Ferejohn suggests that elected officials have an incentive to conduct a significant
portion of their activities in public as a way to signal to their principals—the voters—that
they are trustworthy. By adopting transparent practices, lawmakers offer voters better
tools to monitor their responsiveness; voters are therefore more willing to trust officials
with control over more resources.20 However, empirical tests of this suggestion have not
been conclusive, in either direction.21
One final stage in the budget process has an entirely different transparency
profile. In some years, the legislative and executive branches clash over budget policy,
and interbranch negotiations are required to pass the appropriations and reconciliation
bills necessary to implement budget objectives and to keep the federal government
operating. This occurred, for example, in 1990 when the first President Bush’s vow of
“no new taxes” collided with a fiscal reality that threatened to result in substantial acrossthe-board cuts (sequesters) in federal programs.22 The framework for deficit reduction put
in place in the mid-1980s by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings had proved unworkable, and
without a comprehensive restructuring and a deal to cut spending and raise taxes, a
budget crisis was unavoidable and threatened a larger financial disaster. Accordingly, in a
budget summit held entirely in private, key lawmakers and executive branch officials
negotiated the Budget Enforcement Act of 199023 and a budget reconciliation bill that
included a mix of tax increases and spending reductions. The ultimate product of the
summit was presented to Congress as a conference report (at first rejected by the House,

20

See Ferejohn, supra note 2.
See supra note 2.
22
For a discussion of the 1990 budget summit, see Barbara Sinclair, Unorthodox Lawmaking: New
Legislative Process in the U.S. Congress 77-79 (2d ed. 2000). For discussions of budget summits generally,
see John Gilmour, Strategic Disagreement: Stalemate in American Politics 148-52 (1995); Elizabeth
Garrett, The Congressional Budget Process: Strengthening the Party-in-Government, 100 Colum. L. Rev.
702, 724-29 (2000).
23
Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990).
21

10

Budget Transparency

1/24/2006

although a revised version was subsequently passed24), but the deals reached to produce
the compromise occurred in closed sessions.
This informal device—the budget summit—has been used on several occasions
when interbranch compromise was difficult but necessary. Because summits are not
formal entities with rules governing their conduct and because the only people involved
are elected officials from Congress and executive branch officials from the White House
and departments, open meeting rules do not apply. When it occurs, this final stage of
deliberations concerning the federal budget is entirely opaque.
Given all this, the difficult question is whether the equilibrium with respect to
openness that has been reached in the federal budget process—whether by explicit rule or
by practice—is optimal. In the remainder of the paper, we will assess two dimensions
along which the degree of transparency can be evaluated. First, it can be measured
according to what sort of discussion and deliberation it tends to encourage, namely, how
transparency affects the mix of arguing and bargaining, and which type of deliberation is
most suited to making decisions about the various aspects of budgeting. Second, we will
assess how transparency may increase the power of interest groups to monitor and punish
lawmakers, rather then empowering voters to hold legislators accountable on Election
Day, and whether different structures of disclosure could more effectively benefit voters
without similarly benefiting organized special interests.
II. Optimal Transparency
We will first identify the key tradeoffs that determine the costs and benefits of
transparency across different arenas of the budget process. We then propose a framework
of budget-process transparency that is plausibly optimal and might be imposed by a
benevolent institutional designer.25 Subsequently, in Section III, we identify some
institutional constraints and motivational problems that threaten to make this optimum
unattainable.

24

See Aaron Wildavsky & Naomi Caiden, The New Politics of the Budgetary Process 142-43 (3d ed.
2001).
25
The federal budget process is structured by framework laws that set up the rules of deliberation and
decision making, primarily for Congress but also for other budget actors. Elizabeth Garrett, The Purposes
of Framework Laws, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Iss. 717, 723-24 (2005).
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Two Tradeoffs
In any arena, the mix of transparency and opacity has two principal effects. One
effect is that transparency can alter, at least marginally, the extent to which relevant
actors engage in principled argumentation, on the one hand, or overt bargaining, on the
other hand.26 Both arguing and bargaining are indispensable processes for aggregating
judgments or preferences into collective decisions, so optimal structures will combine
both in some mix. Another effect is that transparency promotes accountability. The
crucial question, however, is accountability to whom? Accountability can be good, when
it runs from agents to principals, such as voters or constituents generally; it can also be
bad, when it runs from agents to third parties such as transfer-seeking groups. We take up
these points in turn and then sketch an optimal transparency structure for federal
budgeting.
As a preliminary note, in the following discussion we will bracket and ignore the
distinction between two familiar accounts of what it means for legislators to offer publicspirited representation. On one account, legislators act as trustees to promote the general
interest of the polity as a whole; on another, legislators act as delegates who are charged
with promoting the interests only of their constituency, usually defined along geographic
lines. The difference between these accounts, while important, is immaterial to our
discussion. Instead we contrast both these accounts, on the one hand, with legislative
capture by organized interest groups, on the other. By “capture” we mean systematic
legislative behavior that exclusively promotes the interests of narrowly-defined groups
(much smaller than even the smallest constituency); such groups seek transfers that,
while beneficial to themselves, inflict larger harms on disorganized constituents and
society generally. That sort of representation is objectionable on either the trustee account
of representation or the delegate account, so we need not engage the deeper issues here.
Our picture does assume that not all interest-group activity is good from the social
point of view; to that extent we reject the most optimistic versions of pluralist theory.
Whatever the general case, this assumption should not be very controversial in the budget
setting, where socially harmful transfers and wasteful competition to obtain such transfers
26

Jon Elster, Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies, 2 U. Penn. J. Constl. Law 345, 40515 (2000).
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are hardly unprecedented. Of course some interest-group activity is also socially
beneficial, as when organized groups monitor each other, offset each other’s influence, or
supply voters and constituents with useful information. Nothing in these points is
inconsistent with our proposals, as we discuss below.
Arguing and Bargaining. Arguing, let us say, is deliberation (whether or not
sincere in some subjective sense) that is pragmatically constrained to rest on impartial
and internally consistent reasons.27 The stuff of bargaining, by contrast, consists of
credible threats and promises, usually, though not inevitably, in the service of the selfinterest of the bargainers. Transparency dampens overtly self-interested bargaining and
pushes officials in the direction of principled argumentation. In the glare of transparency,
people tend to offer neutral principles related to the public good, not bargains based
solely on private interests.
This marginal effect can either be good or bad, depending on the setting. Bargains
may represent corrupt deals by which agents enrich themselves at principals’ expense,
but bargains also permit logrolls that may allow the legislative process to register the
intensity of constituents’ preferences,28 and that help to appease policy losers by giving
everyone something. Argument by reference to neutral principles, by contrast, often
pushes policy towards the extremes, resulting in total victory or total defeat.
Transparency also subjects public deliberation to reputational constraints: officials will
stick to initial positions, once announced, for fear of appearing to vacillate or capitulate,
and this effect will make deliberation more polarized and more partisan. The framers
closed the Philadelphia convention to outsiders precisely to prevent initial positions from
hardening prematurely.29 Finally, transparency may simply drive decision making
underground, creating “deliberations” that are sham rituals while the real bargaining is
conducted in less accessible and less formal venues, off the legislative floor.

27

See id. at 372-3.
Logrolling may, of course, either permit socially beneficial trades or inflict socially harmful externalities
on nontraders. Much depends on the details of the situation. “Today, no consensus exists in the normative
public choice literature as to whether logrolling is on net welfare enhancing or welfare reducing, that is,
whether logrolling constitutes a positive- or a negative-sum game.” Thomas Stratmann, Logrolling, in
Perspectives on Public Choice: A Handbook 322, 322 (D.C. Mueller, ed., 1997).
29
For details and references, see Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure,
71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 372 n.30 (2004).
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Although the relevant questions and answers relating to deliberative transparency
vary from setting to setting, it is possible to offer a general guide to the relative costs and
benefits of arguing and bargaining across contexts. The principal benefit of transparency
is to dampen self-interested bargaining—including in this category bargaining by
legislators who act as tightly constrained agents for self-interested private groups, a topic
we take up shortly. The principal cost of transparency is that the glare of the public
spotlight can produce bad deliberation that is not conducive to necessary compromise—
deliberation infected by posturing and ideological polarization. This suggests a rule of
thumb: in general, the less information legislators have about how decisions will affect
their interests, the less self-interested bargaining is possible in any event; the deliberative
distortions produced by transparency are then all cost for no benefit. On this logic, to the
extent that legislators must necessarily act behind a partial “veil of uncertainty,”30 opacity
is better, all else equal, whereas transparency is better in settings where legislators have
thick information about the effect of particular decisions on their interests.31 As we will
suggest below, this suggests that earlier stages in the budget process should be more
opaque than later stages, because earlier stages occur behind a partial veil of uncertainty.
Accountability: Good and Bad. One of the primary rationales for increased
transparency in government is to reduce the monitoring costs borne by the principals—
voters—to ensure that their agents—lawmakers—pursue their objectives. The principalagent relationship does not fully describe the relationship between voters and elected
officials, nor is it the only motive for transparency,32 but it captures a great deal of the
interaction and provides a framework for analysis. We have already noted that the
framework explains why, even in the absence of open meeting requirements, one would
expect to observe some level of transparency in democratic governments as lawmakers

30

See Geoffrey Brennan & James M. Buchanan, The Reason of Rules 28-31 (1985); James M. Buchanan,
The Calculus of Consent 77-80 (1962). The source of the idea, although not of the phrase, is John C.
Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk Taking, 61 J. Pol. Econ. 434,
434-435 (1953).
31
Cf. Jon Elster, Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies, in Legislatures and Constitutionalism: The Role
of the Legislature in the Constitutional State [22] (R. Bauman & T. Kahana, eds. 2006) (forthcoming).
32
See Christopher C. Hood, Transparency, in Encyclopedia of Democratic Thought 700, 701 (P.B. Clarke
& J. Foweraker eds., 2001) (identifying rule of law concerns as also supporting greater transparency).
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seek to increase voter confidence and therefore cause voters to allocate more resources to
lawmakers’ control.33
Many who advocate strong transparency thus appeal to explicit or implicit
principal-agent models. They argue that transparency will increase the ability of voters to
hold elected officials accountable for their decisions because monitoring costs are
reduced. Knowing that their behavior is observable, agents act differently, and principalagent slack is reduced. Corrupt deals—meaning self-interested deals among agents, or
between agents and third parties—will be deterred or chilled. All this assumes that
legislators respond to electoral incentives, but even if one imagines legislators as good
types or bad types in some fixed and exogenous sense, one might still defend
transparency by reference to selection effects.34 Putative candidates who value public
office merely to further their self-interest might decide that a relatively transparent
environment is not conducive to achieving their goals; thus, if transparency works as
intended, only more trustworthy agents will seek elected office.
However, there is an intrinsic cost to transparency, even from an agency
perspective, and even subject to the point that not all bargaining is bad. Transparency
produces not only good accountability that promotes informed democratic participation
and voting, but also bad accountability that promotes capture, in the sense described
above. Once decision making is open to public view, it is not only voters in the
lawmaker’s district or state who observe the behavior; sophisticated and organized
interest groups seeking inefficient transfers, and their lobbyists, can also monitor
legislative behavior that occurs in transparent institutions.35 Although some interest
groups might prefer the secrecy of closed meetings, open sessions provide them a more
direct way of monitoring whether lawmakers keep their promises and how hard
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See Ferejohn, supra note 2; Alt, supra note 2. See also Alt, Lassen & Skilling, supra note 5 (fiscal
transparency in states increases the scale of government and gubernatorial approval, suggesting voters are
willing to trust politicians with more resources when fiscal policy is transparent).
34
See generally Timothy Besley, Political Selection, 19 J. Econ. Persps. 43 (2005); Adrian Vermeule,
Selection Effects in Constitutional Law, 91 Va. L. Rev. 953 (2005).
35
For other discussions of this cost to transparency, see Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of
Information, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 889, 896 (1986); Joseph E. Stiglitz, On Liberty, the Right to Know, and Public
Discourse: The Role of Transparency in Public Life 22 (1999) (Oxford Amnesty Lecture).
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lawmakers work to deliver benefits or to protect the groups from harm.36 Organized
interests seeking transfers can weigh in while the legislation is being written; indeed, in a
world of wireless, instant communication, lobbyists not only provide legislative language
and expertise before mark-ups, they also email input to staff via blackberries while the
meetings are occurring, ensuring that lawmakers hear their views at crucial moments and
that they are aware that they are being watched closely. In a world of closed meetings,
interest groups must rely on second-hand accounts and often cannot be sure what
negotiations had occurred. Furthermore, because most interest group bargains in the
budget context are not obviously corrupt, and many are low salience bargains that voters
will overlook even if they are made in the open,37 the threat of disclosure may not
appreciably reduce the level of private-regarding behavior. Thus, transparency may
empower interest groups and their lobbyists in one realm without substantially harming
them in another.
Contrast this with the situation of the ordinary voter. Although she now can more
easily monitor legislator behavior because of open meeting requirements, she faces a
significant collective action problem if she chooses to closely watch committee hearings.
She bears all the costs of monitoring, yet there is little she can do on her own to punish a
wayward representative. If she succeeds in changing legislative behavior through timely
input or other intervention, all voters in her circumstances benefit without helping defray
any of her monitoring costs. The chance that she will succeed in changing legislative
outcomes is low: she lacks the ability to provide the same level of input in real time that
interest groups and lobbyists can. There are intermediaries like the press and challengers
who can use transparency to monitor lawmakers on behalf of voters and bring egregious
examples to their attention near Election Day. But lawmakers know that it is not certain
voters will pay attention to press stories, and ordinary citizens are not organized to mount
effective action even if they do notice the news. Certainly, lawmakers will be concerned
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For work suggesting that interest groups use their campaign contributions to obtain greater energy and
attention on their issues from politicians, see David P. Baron, Service-Induced Campaign Contributions
and the Electoral Equilibrium, 104 Q.J. Econ. 45 (1989); Richard L. Hall & Frank W. Wayman, Buying
Time: Moneyed Interests and the Mobilization of Bias in Congressional Committees, 84 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.
797 (1990).
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See Kay Lehman Schlozman & John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 396-98
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that particular kinds of behavior will affect voters’ decisions,38 but most decisions made
in a budgeting context are not sufficiently noteworthy to produce electoral consequences.
Our contrast between good and bad accountability, to voters and to interest
groups, is deliberately overdrawn to clarify the issues. Of course, some interest groups
are good, either because they supply pluralistic political competition that increases
efficiency and overall accountability, or because they act as informational intermediaries.
An example of the latter case involves good-government groups who use their access to
supply voters with cues about the position of particular legislators, intelligible accounts
of budgeting decisions, or other useful information. By and large, however, the threat in
the budget setting is that total transparency will increase damaging special-interest
transfers, by exposing decision makers to intensive scrutiny and threats of electoral
retaliation. In the budget setting, the groups that benefit most from fishbowl transparency
and immediate access to details of ongoing negotiations are tightly organized groups
seeking transfers to particular economic interests, rather narrowly defined.
Two Proposals
In light of these tradeoffs, we offer two proposals that would, if feasible and if
implemented, improve the transparency framework of the federal budget process. Our
guiding principles are (1) that opacity becomes more costly as the budget process
proceeds and legislators gain more specific information about how decisions will affect
their interests; (2) that where disclosure does occur, it should be delayed if doing do will
maximize the benefits of information to voters and constituents generally while
minimizing information benefits to organized interest groups. Given these principles, we
propose that decision making at the stage of overall budget allocation should be
nonpublic, and that decision making at later stages should be made transparent, but only
through delayed disclosure.
Closed committee sessions for overall allocation. Within Congress, the first basic
stage of the budgetary process is the allocation of overall spending levels across budget
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See R. Douglas Arnold, The Logic of Congressional Action 82-87(1990). Empirical work suggests that
voters do make electoral decisions based on budget policy. See, e.g., Robert C. Lowry, James E. Alt &
Karen E. Ferree, Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States, 92 Am. Pol. Sci.
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categories or functions. The allocation is developed by the budget committees in both
houses and then formalized through a concurrent budget resolution, which sets out a fiveyear budget plan. The concurrent budget resolution is the internal congressional vehicle
that sets forth macro-budgetary objectives: it sets spending limits for discretionary
programs; determines the amount of revenue that should be raised in taxes; reveals
congressional priorities by dividing resources among various budget functions, which are
the major categories of governmental activities; and provides for the debt limit. It does
not require that any particular programmatic changes be made to achieve its broad goals,
although the budget committees often include nonbinding recommendations for specific
changes or members add such suggestions on the floor. Filling in the details of the budget
resolution is the province of the appropriations committees, the substantive committees
with jurisdiction over entitlement programs, and the tax-writing committees.39
This concurrent resolution stage of the budget process is in some ways analogous
to the process of constitution-making. It puts in place a framework within which
bargaining can occur at subsequent stages; in effect, the resolution sets out constraints
and then delegates authority to tax-writing committees, appropriations committees and
some other committees to make specific policy choices within those constraints, just as a
constitutional convention sets out constraints within which later legislatures and agencies
work. The constraints of the budget resolution are enforced through internal
parliamentary devices such as points of order, some of which can be waived only with
supermajority votes in the Senate.
The analogy is contestable; perhaps the real analogue to the constitution-making
stage is the enactment of framework statutes such as the 1974 Budget Act.40 The only
point we need, however, is that the overall budget allocations are established behind a
partial veil of uncertainty about how macro-level decisions will affect legislators’ specific
interests. At the stage of overall allocation, it is simply unclear what particular programs
and appropriations will emerge from the later stages of the budget process, and hence
unclear exactly how legislators’ interests will be affected by large-scale choices. We do
39

See Allen Schick, The Federal Budget: Politics, Policy, Process 110-17 (rev. ed. 2000) (describing the
structure of the concurrent budget resolution).
40
Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
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not mean to overstate the opacity of the veil; certainly, members think about the
particular programs and tax provisions that will emerge from the entire budget process
when they make macro-budgetary decisions in the concurrent budget resolution.41
However, the overall allocations are reminiscent of constitution-making because they
make value choices at a relatively high level of abstraction, choosing overall priorities—
more for guns or butter?—and then leave it to later periods to connect those priorities to
particulars. Moreover, there is a separation of powers or responsibilities here: large-scale
allocative decisions and priority-setting are done by budget committees, whereas specific
spending decisions at later stages are made by different committees with different
memberships. This difference in control contributes to the uncertainty afflicting members
at the earlier stage, thickening the veil.
At the overall allocation stage, then, legislators will be somewhat uncertain about
how decisions affect their interests, which reduces the risk of self-interested bargaining.
The remaining risk, however, is that transparency will induce bad deliberation, through
posturing, premature hardening of positions, and highly conflictual or principle-ridden
debate. For the same reasons that closing off the federal constitutional convention was
plausibly a successful decision—framers lacked sufficient information to pursue their
own interests, while the lack of transparency produced better deliberation—so too it
seems plausible that large-scale allocative choices might best be made behind closed
doors. To be sure, the outputs of this opaque process will eventually be made public,
when the concurrent resolution is enacted and the committees begin connecting
allocations to particular programs, but the deliberation in the budget committees that
produces the outputs need never be publicized, at least in principle. (Below, we consider
whether such a scheme is in fact feasible, given the incentives of relevant actors and the
political and institutional constraints.)
Finally, at the allocation stage there is a connection between the two senses of
“transparency” identified in Section I. The budget resolution is a relatively intelligible
document. It allocates money to general government functions, not to detailed programs
41

See Elizabeth Garrett, Rethinking the Structures of Decisionmaking in the Federal Budget Process, 35
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functions and determinations of programmatic details).
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or tax subsidies that are hard for outsiders to fully understand; a decision about how
government trades off guns against butter is less detailed and less obscure than the
decision about how to design the various programs to deliver the guns or butter. The
relative intelligibility of the budget resolution strengthens the case for opacity during the
committee deliberations that produce the resolution; any reduction in good accountability
is less here than in other settings. Conversely, the budget resolution, because it proceeds
at a high level of generality, tends to be the majority party’s statement of its principles.
This makes any public compromise particularly costly for the minority, which in turn
encourages posturing. Here opacity can lower the reputational and political stakes of
disagreement, helping to avert bitter strife over principles and easing negotiations at later
stages of the budget process.
At those later stages, the calculus changes. As legislators gain highly specific
information about particular programs, as the veil of uncertainty shreds, there is
increasing reason to fear that opacity will produce unchecked self-interested bargaining.
Conversely, the principal cost of transparency—the poisoning of deliberation—
diminishes in any event, just because there is less deliberation of any kind occurring.
Bargaining over specifics comes to the fore, and transparency can help to chill or deter
the most self-regarding bargains. The legislative work in the wake of the concurrent
budget resolution is drafting appropriations bills to allocate money within the budget
functions to various specific programs, writing revenue legislation with detailed tax
subsidies, or constructing or revising actual entitlement programs. This is the prototypical
arena of logrolling; the discussions in these committees tend to be less partisan and more
pragmatic, at least for the vast majority of programs that are below most voters’ radar
screens. Organized interests seeking transfers are vitally concerned in all aspects of
appropriation, entitlement and revenue bills because they actually receive their benefits
from this legislation. In contrast, the concurrent resolution merely defines the likely
universe of resources available to fund the actual programs and tax subsidies.42
How do these prescriptions match up with the current rules? Committee meetings
considering appropriations bills, tax proposals, omnibus budget reconciliation acts, and
42
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entitlement programs are where much concrete bargaining takes place, and these hearings
are generally subject to strong transparency requirements. This is as it should be given
the logic we have set out. However, our logic suggests important changes in the
framework shaping deliberation at other stages. First, committee deliberations at the
macro-allocation stage culminating in a concurrent resolution should be opaque, contrary
to current practice. Second, currently opaque budget summits, where the ultimate deals
are struck in case ordinary processes break down, should take place in the public eye.
Budget summits are entirely matters of logrolling and pragmatic compromise as the two
branches, and sometimes the two parties, hammer out a bargain to keep the government
running and avert a fiscal disaster. Quite obviously, political constraints may rule out
either or both of these proposals, as we discuss below.
Although we tentatively conclude that disclosure of certain stages of the budget
process remains an important aspect of the budget framework and should be extended
into realms currently closed, such as budget summits, we have not yet said anything
about the timing of disclosure, where disclosure is to occur at all. We turn next to that
important aspect of transparency.
Delayed disclosure—in general. The tradeoff between good and bad
accountability arises from the existence of two audiences with frequently diverging
objectives and with asymmetrical abilities to monitor lawmakers. Legislators know that
the two audiences have vastly different capabilities to monitor and punish, so
transparency operates to reduce principal-agent slack between organized interests and
lawmakers more than it reduces slack between voters and their elected representatives. In
principle, the solution would be to keep organized interests in the dark about legislative
behavior while fully revealing it to voters. Although that solution is impossible—once
information is provided to voters, it is provided to everyone—it may be possible, in some
cases, to deprive transfer-seeking organized interests of the information while the deals
are being struck and interest group influence is most problematic, while at the same time
ensuring that voters have access to information before they cast their ballots. Delayed
disclosure is a tactic that may provide many, if not all, of the accountability benefits of
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transparency while mitigating its accountability costs.43 A similar technique is used in
some countries’ open records laws, which preserve confidentiality of some documents
during official decision making processes but allow broad dissemination at a later time to
enable voters to learn about the inputs relevant to a decision once it has been
announced.44
The basic rationale for delayed disclosure here is to maximize the benefits of
information to voters generally while minimizing the benefits of information to interest
groups. This general aim in turn has two components. First, delayed disclosure prevents
interest groups from bringing immediate pressure to bear on legislators and other
policymakers while deliberations proceed. To be sure, legislators may anticipate
punishment from interest groups who later learn that their demands have not been met.
Under delayed disclosure, however, it is hard for interest groups to make effective realtime interventions, to the extent that they are acting in the dark. Delayed disclosure gives
decision makers breathing space and room to maneuver.
Second, delayed disclosure can be structured to mitigate the ex ante threat of
interest-group retaliation at election time. How can electorally-relevant information be
channeled to voters but not to interest groups? It is unclear whether this trick can in fact
be accomplished, as we emphasize below; but it is possible that it can, because of the
structure and timing of the modern political campaign. The key point is that interest
groups seeking to maximize their influence must act earlier in the election cycle than
voters, who can wait until Election Day to pass judgment on their agents. Interest groups
43
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must target campaign funds, advertising and other resources at earlier stages of the
electoral cycle; indeed, such resources are often most influential at the earliest stage, as
parties are assessing the pool of potential candidates to decide which will become actual
candidates, and as incumbents seek to discourage serious challengers. If interest groups
must act before voters, then delayed disclosure can force interest groups to act in the dark
while voters act with sufficient information.
To be sure, interest groups will be able to use the information disclosed before
Election Day in one political cycle to allocate resources and enforce threats or promises
in a later cycle. But the political discount rate—the rate at which politicians discount the
future—will assure that an interest groups’ threat to punish the politician two elections
hence will be less impressive than a threat tied to the next election. Delayed disclosure
effectively lengthens the legislators’ term of office, but only for groups enforcing bad
accountability; such groups would plausibly prefer more frequent elections to maintain a
tighter hold on legislators. For purposes of good accountability to voters, however,
delayed disclosure does not effectively change the frequency of election; voters would
still receive information in time to vote competently in the next succeeding election.
The devil is in the details, of course. The hard part is determining the right time to
release the details of the budget negotiations. The delay should be long enough to reduce
interest groups’ ability to pressure lawmakers as they make decisions, but the information
must be publicized early enough to influence electoral outcomes. This latter requirement
means that the information must be available well before the actual elections because it
will influence the decisions of other viable candidates, who must decide whether to
challenge incumbents who participated in unsavory or questionable deals. The
information, then, must be made public not only before the primary election but also
before the time candidates file to appear on the ballot. Disclosure must also occur early
enough for challengers to begin to raise money necessary for a successful campaign.
Such early disclosure also increases the power of interest groups because they can use the
information to direct campaign resources to lawmakers who work energetically on their
behalf or to the opponents of those who reneged on deals. Disclosure after the period
when interest groups’ campaign contributions can make the most difference is the
optimal time for publicity, but revealing information that late in the campaign might also
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reduce the ability of voters—and intermediaries like the press and challengers—to use the
information appropriately. This is an optimization problem—the problem is to find the
disclosure point that maximizes the difference between the benefits of information to
voters and the benefits of information to efficiency-reducing interest groups.
The available information about costs and benefits is too crude to be sure where
the exact optimum is located, but we suggest, as a reasonable guess, that disclosure
should be delayed until a few weeks before first the primary elections for congressional
seats. For many House seats, the primary is the only possible venue for competition, so
continuing secrecy past this stage of the electoral cycle will deny voters a meaningful
chance to act on the information. We emphasize that this date is only a guess—it may be
too late in the electoral process to allow serious challengers to emerge, and it may also be
too early, in that it would allow interest groups substantial influence in the campaign for
the general election, although at least such groups will have reduced sway in the selection
of the two major candidates.
Our proposal of delayed disclosure is speculative, and offered to provoke ideas.
We emphasize that the proposal might fail, for strictly factual reasons. It might turn out,
in fact, that there just is no disclosure point that is both (1) sufficiently late so as to
hamper the ability of interest groups to retaliate against legislators in the relevant election
cycle and also (2) sufficiently early as to give would-be challengers and informational
intermediaries the material they need to inform voters. We emphasize, however, that the
current system, in which transfer-seeking interest groups get immediate information from
budgeting committees, is an extreme or corner solution, one that is most unlikely to be
the best possible arrangement, in light of all relevant costs and benefits. Quite plausibly
some delay in disclosure would improve matters, both to give legislators breathing room
and to hamper interest-group retaliation, although it is difficult to say in the abstract and
with any precision how much delay would be best.
Finally, a clarifying point is in order. When we suggest that some deliberations be
kept opaque and some be subject to delayed disclosure, we do not mean that the former
will be kept secret permanently. In a long enough time frame everything is disclosed,
even presidential papers and highly classified documents. For our purposes, following the
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logic suggested above, “delayed disclosure” just means disclosure that occurs after the
deliberations, but sometime before the next election after the relevant budget is adopted;
“opacity” means that the relevant deliberations are not disclosed in time for the next
following election.
Delayed disclosure—committees. We now turn to problems of delayed disclosure
in particular institutional arenas, within the larger budget process. A system of delayed
disclosure might allow legislative bargaining in appropriations and tax-writing
committees, within the framework of a concurrent budget resolution, to occur behind
closed doors. Transcripts of deliberation would be kept, and any documents generated
during the process would be retained for later release. If ongoing committee deliberations
could be kept secret, then interest groups’ ability to affect the details of spending and
revenue decisions and to monitor lawmakers would be reduced. Permanent secrecy is not
desirable, however, because it would insulate corrupt deals from publicity and eliminate
the deterrent effect of disclosure. Thus transcripts and other documents of committee
deliberations must be fully disclosed after the budget has passed but before Election Day.
Knowing that their discussions and deals will not be kept secret forever, lawmakers
would have strong incentives to refrain from entering into bargains that could not
withstand the sunlight of public disclosure. Moreover, because the output of the
committee deliberations—the final mix of appropriations, entitlement spending and
taxes—would be public and floor deliberations would be open, obviously corrupt and
questionable deals would likely be discovered and scrutinized as the budget was being
developed.
If delayed disclosure were adopted in a budget framework law shaping committee
deliberations, it should be accompanied by modifications in the Lobbying Disclosure Act
(LDA)45 to provide substantially better information about which representatives and
senators are meeting with which lobbyists and on what topics. The concern is that
temporary secrecy not only protects lawmakers from interest group pressure that
undermines the public interest, but also protects corruption. Efficiency-reducing bargains
can be combated not only by the threat of ultimate disclosure of the details of
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deliberations but also by immediate disclosure of meetings that members of Congress
hold with lobbyists. The public can reason from the fact of those meetings, and the
amount of money spent to support them, about the likely influence exerted by an
organized group on a key lawmaker at a pivotal time in the budget cycle. Currently, the
LDA does not provide very specific information about which lawmaker a lobbyists meets
with or about the precise subject matter of their discussions.46 If the committee
deliberations about budgeting that occur after in the appropriations, tax-writing and other
substantive committees are kept temporarily secret, as we suggest, then more aggressive
disclosure of lobbying contacts would be required.47
Delayed disclosure—budget summits. When they occur, budget summits typically
involve a small group of people from the executive and legislative branches.48
Deliberations that occur in summits are not open to the public, or even to other members
of the legislature, although the ultimate deal is presented to Congress, typically in a
conference report of an omnibus budget reconciliation act or an omnibus appropriations
law, for an up or down vote. Thus, the output of this process is public, even if the
inputs—from interest group influence to political deals reached to provide a consensus
document—are not. Often the product of a budget summit is not fully understood at the
time it is presented to Congress because there is often little time between the summit’s
proposal and the final vote, but the terms can be scrutinized by the press and opponents
later to ensure accountability. Thus, delayed disclosure of deliberations of summit
meetings promises to increase accountability relative to the status quo. Notes and drafts
of documents could be disclosed in the weeks following the summit to provide better
insight into the deals reached while not unduly inhibiting the give-and-take required to
form a compromise.49 Even disclosing only the drafts of documents, with records of
which political player made which changes, without disclosure of transcripts or similar
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records of discussions at the meetings would provide a sufficient record to ensure
accountability at some point.50
Furthermore, a system of delayed disclosure with respect to budget summits
would prove superior to the more typical open meeting rules that require immediate
publicity of deliberations. One of the advantages of the current structure of budget
summits is that political actors, working in private, can avoid fiscal train wrecks by
reaching politically sensitive deals that may anger interest groups. When the deals are
revealed, politicians can claim that they worked as hard as possible to further the
objectives of groups affiliated with them, but they were forced to take the bitter with the
sweet to craft a deal that is, all things considered, the best outcome. Because the product
of summits is presented to Congress as a take-it-or-leave-it proposal, groups know that
they have little ability to unravel the compromise once it emerges from the summit. In
reality, participants in the summit often pragmatically retreat from extreme positions and
work to craft a compromise that averts political and fiscal disaster. Although delayed
disclosure may inhibit that dynamic somewhat—because politicians know they cannot
escape accountability for their decisions after the transcripts and drafts are made public
and their claims of working to protect certain interest groups’ benefits may be
undermined by the record of the discussions—temporary secrecy will still protect the
interactions from immediate pressure and interference. Disclosure, whether simultaneous
or delayed, inevitably affects the dynamics of negotiations. That is its purpose; the hard
question is to get the balance of transparency and opacity right to allow compromise in an
environment of accountability.
Delayed disclosure—advisory committees. Another arena where rules of delayed
disclosure should be adopted is decision making by federal advisory committees. These
committees often consider matters relevant to budgeting, from Social Security and
entitlement reform to tax reform.51 Federal advisory committees currently use techniques
50

Similar rules of delayed disclosure should be considered for congressional task forces, particularly those
that bring forward legislative proposals. These entities are different from budget summits, which are
interbranch and often bipartisan, because they are often arms of the majority party and thus may also
discuss party strategy which is appropriately kept confidential. But, to the extent that a task force is acting
in the place of a congressional committee, then it should be subject to parallel rules of disclosure.
51
Although our focus here is on advisory committees working in the budgeting arena, our
recommendations apply to all federal advisory committees.
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to allow them some opacity during decision making notwithstanding provisions in the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA)52 that require relatively immediate disclosure
of drafts and other documents to the public.53 For example, President Bush’s Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform that met during 200554 did not make public any drafts or
other documents that were seen by four or fewer of the nine panel members, allowing
five working groups of four members each to deliberate entirely behind closed doors. As
long as these groups did not formally provide advice to the President or a federal officer
or agency, they were not subject to FACA’s transparency requirements. In reality,
however, the real work of the Panel occurred in private; the public meetings were used
for taking testimony of witnesses selected by the Panel and discussing reform themes that
had been more fully debated and largely but not formally decided in the working
groups.55 It was not a coincidence that the Tax Panel’s two reform options had virtually
identical provisions affecting individual tax code56 even though the two working groups
responsible for the options had entirely different membership. By the time public
deliberations occurred, key decisions had been at least informally reached and some of
the most revealing disagreements had occurred in private.57

52

5 U.S.C. App. 2.
It seems clear that FACA was intended to subject all of an advisory committee’s deliberations to public
scrutiny as they occur. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 92-1017 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3491,
3500 (stating that § 10(b) of the Act, which requires that all records and files “which were made available
to or prepared for or by each advisory committee” be made available to the public, “has the effect of
assuring openness in the operations of advisory committees. This provision coupled with the requirement
that complete and accurate minutes of committee meetings be kept serves to prevent the surreptitious use of
advisory committees to further the interests of any special interest group. Along with the provisions for
balanced representation ... this requirement of openness is a strong safeguard of the public interest.”). But
the regulations interpreting the Act have provided guidance to committees that seek to insulate some of
their deliberations from public scrutiny. See 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.35(a); 41 C.F.R. § 102-3.160; 41 C.F.R. pt.
102-3, subpt. D, app. A, 66 Fed. Reg. 37728, 37729(July 19, 2001).
54
Ex. Order No. 13,369, 70 Fed. Reg. 2323 (Jan. 7, 2005).
55
Similar nonpublic negotiations between only a subset of a committee occurred in 1981 as the National
Commission of Social Security Reform (the “Greenspan Commission”) deliberated on reform of the Social
Security system. See Gilmour, supra note 22, at 156-58. As with the President’s Tax Reform Panel, the
Social Security Commission was governed by FACA. See Charter of the National Commission on Social
Security Reform (1983) (noting that the Commission was governed by FACA and that all meetings would
be open unless otherwise determined by the Secretary of Health and Human Services), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/gspan10.html.
56
President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, Simple, Fair, and Pro-Growth: Proposals to Fix
America’s Tax System 63-95 (2005).
57
It is the case, however, that the working groups made no formal decisions about recommendations;
rather, all such decisions were made by the full panel in open meetings or a public vote. See Letter from
Jeffrey Kupfer to Rob Wells, Deputy Bureau Chief of Dow Jones Newswires, June 8, 2005 (noting that
53
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This structure of private deliberations by subgroups and public deliberation by a
full advisory committee is in some ways consistent with our recommendations for a mix
of transparency and opacity. Confidential deliberations dampen posturing and
partisanship and improve the quality of deliberations, because privacy allows advisory
committees to consider reform alternatives and guidance that would elicit strongly
negative interest group reaction without interference from those groups. The problem
with the current structure is that only subgroups of fewer than a majority of the full
committee can discuss and deliberate in private, denying that environment to meetings of
the full committee. This is an issue whether the advisory committee is made up of
members working in their individual capacities to provide advice based on their
independent judgment or whether they are appointed as representatives of a particular
interest.58 In the latter case, immediate transparency of deliberations may make
compromise even more difficult as representatives are unwilling to back away from their
groups’ positions in an environment that allows pressure to be applied as deliberations
unfold. Again, we note that allowing some privacy for deliberations does not mean that
disclosure never occurs; the option of delayed disclosure for advisory committees is one
that could strike the right balance to elicit better advice and reduce the influence of
organized special interests.
We therefore suggest several amendments to FACA to construct a formal system
of delayed disclosure. First, the full panel should be allowed to deliberate in private, with
the requirement that all these deliberations, as well as any by subgroups of the committee,
be disclosed after the panel’s report has been. Votes and final decisions would have to
occur in public or be revealed clearly in any report providing advice to the executive
branch; the ultimate advice itself must be made public at the same time it is transmitted to
the federal official or agency. Documents and working drafts generated by the full panel
or subgroups should be automatically disclosed within some, relatively short time period
after the release of the final report or, for committees that exist for several years, after

subgroups’ work could be done in private because the Panel would make all decisions about
recommendations in open meetings) (on file with authors).
58
See Office of Government Ethics, Memorandum to Designated Agency Ethics Officials on Federal
Advisory Committee Appointments (Aug. 18, 2005) (describing difference between the two kinds of
appointments.
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they file their charters, a biennial requirement for longstanding advisory committees.59
Such a mandate for disclosure of documents generated by subgroups would actually
improve transparency because, as long as the subgroup does not directly advise the
executive branch, those documents now never have to be made public.60
Second, records of any private deliberations of working groups or the full panel
should be maintained and disclosed after the advisory committee has been disbanded or
regularly throughout the life of the committee. There is a cost to such delayed disclosure
of the content of deliberations; although disclosure would provide better insight into the
thought processes of panel members and the compromises reached, disclosure, albeit
delayed, could inhibit robust discussion. We believe keeping a record of the discussion is
warranted and would not chill deliberation severely; after all, off-the-record discussions
are still possible in even less formal settings between individual members or with staff.
Moreover, if panel members knew that disclosure would occur sometime in the future,
they would be deterred from making arguments solely based on self-interest in the
working group deliberations, and thus the overall discussions might be better suited to
reach public-regarding outcomes. We left open the possibility of keeping the details of
deliberations by budget summits private, and mandating only release of drafts of
documents; however, because advisory committees members have less direct
accountability than budget summiteers who are elected officials and high-level

59

Federal advisory committees terminate after two years unless their duration is explicitly extended. In all
cases, the committees must report publicly on their work every two years. See 41 C.F.R. § 102, subpt. B,
app. A; 66 Fed. Reg. 37740 (July 19, 2001).
60
For example, none of the dozens of revenue estimates provided by Treasury to the subgroups of the Tax
Reform Panel have been released to the public, not even in the final report. This information is crucial to
judging the recommendations and the assertions in the report that the proposals are revenue neutral and
adhere to the current tax burden. In the long run, the drafts of the some of the Treasury documents used by
working groups may become public through Freedom of Information Act requests, so the secrecy
surrounding this aspect of the deliberations may not permanent. In addition, the Panel’s staff archived all
the documents so they may be made public at some later time. See Email from Jeffrey F. Kupfer, Executive
Director, President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, to Elizabeth Garrett (Dec. 1, 2005) (on file
with authors). No transcripts were kept of the working groups’ deliberations; therefore, those discussions
cannot be disclosed. In contrast, transcripts of all open hearings and meetings are available on the Panel’s
webpage. See www.taxreformpanel.gov (transcripts of each public meeting provided on Panel website).
Press covered all the open hearings; media efforts to learn about the deliberations of the working groups
were unavailing. See Letter from William A. Dobrovir, Attorney, Tax Analysts, to Jeffrey F. Kupfer,
Executive Director, President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (July 20, 2005) (on file with
authors) (requesting documents relating to subgroups); Memorandum from Kenneth R. Schmalzbach to
Jeffrey F. Kupfer, “Subject: Document Search” (Aug. 8, 2005) (providing response) (on file with authors).
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presidential appointees, we believe more aggressive delayed disclosure is warranted in
this context.
Third, all committee members, as well as staff, should disclose any contacts with
lobbyists or interest groups so that the public has a sense of who has input into the
process even if the substance of that input is not known during the advisory committee’s
deliberations. This disclosure should be relatively immediate, not delayed as would be the
case for disclosure of deliberations and working drafts. The LDA can serve as a model
for this new requirement, but the recommendations discussed above to provide more
specific information about lobbying contacts should be incorporated here as well.
Fourth, we recommend that, with advisory committees, as well as with all the
other budget institutions we have discussed, the rules concerning what must occur
immediately in public and what can occur initially in private settings, with later
disclosure, be clearly stated in a framework law. Each federal advisory committee no
doubt reaches different kinds of accommodations concerning disclosure in relatively ad
hoc ways, although specialized staff advise committees about the rules and precedents
and federal regulations adopted in 2001 set out some rules and examples concerning
transparency. In our view, delayed disclosure is the optimal structure for decision making
in some kinds of entities, but the decision to use temporary secrecy itself should be made
openly61 and the rules should clearly provide the limits of secrecy and ensure that
virtually all private deliberations by advisory committees be made public at some point.
Adopting an explicit framework of delayed disclosure for much of the work of
advisory committees, with final deliberations in public, is also justified because it will
reduce the costs incurred currently as committees work to evade the current suboptimal
rules. For example, the arrangements used by the Tax Reform Panel to circumvent
FACA’s open meeting requirements hampered the Panel’s deliberations in tangible ways.
Most significantly, private deliberation never occurred in a group of more than four of the
nine members. Even with relatively balanced subgroups, that configuration denied the
panel the input of all members on key issues until very late in the process, just weeks
61

See Dennis F. Thompson, Democratic Secrecy, 114 Pol. Sci. Q. 181, 184-85 (1999) (arguing that any
rules providing for temporary secrecy must be justified and the decision to allow such secrecy made
through open and public decision making).
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before release of the final report.62 It also enhances the power of staff relative to panel
members because staff talk frequently with all members and attend all subgroup
meetings. One Panel member, who has been critical of FACA’s disclosure provisions,
suggests that the final report could have been more detailed had the full panel been able
to deliberate privately;63 certainly, more specific agreements on certain issues might have
emerged had larger groups been able to interact. Let us underscore again that we are not
recommending that advisory committees be allowed to keep their deliberations secret
forever; only that more of their work should be closed to the public while it is occurring,
with disclosure delayed only until after the release of the final report or other regular
reporting.
III. Second-Best Problems: Motivations and Constraints
So far we have discussed the optimal framework for transparency in the budget
process, on the deliberately counterfactual assumption that such a framework could be
imposed and enforced by an impartial institutional designer. We now turn to a range of
second-best problems. Such problems arise from two sources: institutional and political
constraints on implementation, and the motivation of participants. In general, although
such problems are real, it is unclear that the constraints are so tight as to rule out adoption
of the optimal transparency framework.
The supply of optimal rules
The first problem arises on what might be called the supply side. Even if the
framework we have sketched is desirable, which actors, if any, will be motivated to adopt
it? Our analysis presupposes that legislators are either self-interested or act, at least
sometimes, as tightly constrained agents for interest groups and other self-interested
actors. This is an instance of a general problem, called the “determinacy paradox” or
62

Interested members can be kept informed about the work of working groups on which they do not serve
through conversations with staff or with other members; indeed, some advisory committees appoint the
chair of the committee as a member of all working groups so that at least one member has a comprehensive
view of all the deliberation.
63
See Heidi Glenn, Frenzel Criticizes Sunshine Law Governing Tax Panel, Tax Notes, Nov. 28, 2005, at
1126. Frenzel’s remarks are not particularly consistent on this point: in this speech, he argued that more
detail would have been possible with more secrecy but also contended that too much detail was included on
the recommendations to revise the tax subsidy for interest on home mortgages. We do not agree with
Frenzel’s conclusion that the solution is to repeal the disclosure provisions. Chairman Connie Mack has
also criticized FACA’s open meeting requirements. See Heidi Glenn, Perspectives on Tax Reform From
Connie Mack, Tax Notes, Jan. 9, 2006, at 26.
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“Bhagwati paradox.”64 Where the motives of relevant actors are endogenized as selfinterested, and not assumed to be benevolent or public-spirited, there is little point in
recommending reforms on public-regarding grounds. By hypothesis, public-spirited
recommendations will fall on deaf ears.
Here two points are worth highlighting. First, it is valuable to identify (even
approximately) the optimal structure of transparency rules. Absent that knowledge,
reformers do not even know in which direction to push; in that case the question whether
it is possible to attain ideal reforms does not even arise. Our principal aim here is to
sketch desirable reforms, at the level of first-best. Furthermore, our analysis should draw
into serious question reformers’ typical reaction to problems of accountability:
increasingly aggressive disclosure rules aimed at immediate publicity. We suggest that a
more nuanced approach is likely to yield better results, and that the option of delayed
disclosure should at least be subject to serious discussion.
Second, the supply-side problem is frequently overcome within Congress.
Consider the range of framework statutes by which legislators act to dampen interestgroup influence and to check their own (future) self-interested motivations. The Electoral
Count Act of 188765 was intended to dampen partisanship and self-interest in the context
of disputed presidential elections; the Base Realignment and Closure Acts,66 first passed
in 1988, reduce lawmakers’ ability to protect military bases important to the economy of
their district but not vital to the nation’s defense; aspects of the federal budget process
make it more difficult for members of Congress to freely engage in distributive politics.67
One mechanism at work here is the veil of uncertainty. Legislators’ uncertainty about
how decisions will affect their interests not only helps to determine optimal transparency
rules, as discussed in Section II, but also helps to ensure that the optimal transparency
rules will be enacted. At any particular time, legislators can and do agree on framework
statutes that improve future decision making for all concerned. In such cases agreement is
possible because it is not clear, at the time of adoption, exactly whose interests will be
64

See Brendan O’Flaherty & Jagdish Bhagwati, Will Free Trade with Political Science Put Normative
Economics Out of Work?, 9 Econ. & Pol. 207 (1996).
65
24 Stat. 373 (1887).
66
For the first such act, see Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act,
Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988).
67
See Garrett, supra note 25, at 722-30 (providing examples of framework laws).
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benefited and whose hurt by the application of the framework rules in future periods.68 It
is an open question whether such a mechanism might allow enactment of a framework
statute implementing the transparency structure we propose.
This proposal—with opacity at some stages and delayed disclosure in others—
might garner more sincere support from lawmakers than the current tendency toward
immediate disclosure of all deliberation. It seems likely that at least some legislators have
supported full disclosure only in response to constituent demands following scandals like
Watergate, and would be interested in our more nuanced proposal. Legislators might
prefer to conduct some of their budget deliberations out of the public eye—or at least
away from the immediate pressure of organized groups and their lobbyists.69 Whether
such a proposal could be sufficiently explained to constituents, given high current levels
of distrust for elected representatives, is an open question.
Circumvention
Another

problem

is

circumvention

of

transparency

through

informal

arrangements. Sometimes transparency requirements seem futile, because all relevant
actors desire to preserve opacity and can collude to keep real decision making out of the
public eye, in a way that is difficult for external enforcers to monitor and prevent. Some
even go so far as to claim that transparency rules are a sham, because they are
systematically or at least frequently evaded.70 The evasion phenomenon is real, but any
conclusion that transparency requirements are ineffectual would be far too cavalier.
Almost any institutional rules can be circumvented, but circumvention is costly; the
higher the costs, the more effective the rule. Where transparency is imposed in order to
chill self-interested bargains, the fact that self-interested bargains must be attempted
through furtive whispers behind closed doors may be a sign that the transparency rules

68

See id. at 736-41; Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 Yale L.J. 399,
428-29 (2001).
69
However, to the extent that our proposal will reduce the amount of campaign and other support provided
to lawmakers from interest groups, they will prefer the status quo.
70
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 105-167 (1998) (“Thompson Committee Report”) (studying the federal elections of
1996 and concluding that campaign finance laws, including disclosure provisions, are frequently evaded or
ignored); Brian Fletcher, Case Comment, Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, 28 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 605, 613 (2004) (arguing that one criticism of FACA is that “its
requirements of balance and transparency are routinely ignored with impunity because the Act is largely
unenforceable”).
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are working just as intended, rather than a symptom of failure. Where self-interested
actors must act by indirection, the costs of striking bargains will rise, and fewer of them
will be struck.
Leaks
The circumvention problem is that actors can opt for secrecy in violation of rules
prescribing transparency. The reverse problem is that of leaks, where actors can opt for
transparency in violation of rules prescribing secrecy. Perhaps uncoordinated leaks,
difficult to deter (especially where the leaker is a legislator or staff member protected by
the Speech and Debate Clause71), will undermine opacity, whatever the formal rules say.
Recall in this connection Ferejohn’s claim that legislators and other agents have
individual-level incentives to supply transparency to constituents, even if doing so would
be undesirable from the social point of view.72 Reporters and lobbyists will expend
significant resources to ferret out the information before it is released, which could result
in unproductive rent seeking as officials leak valuable information to favored members of
the press or lobbyists with connections and clout.73
It is much too casual, however, to assume that leaks will inevitably undermine
any regime of opacity. In both the executive branch and Congress, most secrets are kept,
most of the time. Leaks make news because they occur against a less salient backdrop,
that of a system in which national security intelligence, privileged and confidential
documents and deliberations, and other information are routinely kept secret. The
problem of leaks is real, but one must give specific and concrete reasons to think that
opacity in one domain will be unsustainable, when opacity in other domains is in fact
consistently sustained. Recall, as an important mechanism that reduces incentives to leak,
that noncredible leaks bring no benefit to the leaker. Any legislator can come out of a
closed session and report to interest groups that he advocated their pet projects, but the

71

U.S. Const. Art. 1, §6. See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (applying Speech or Debate
Clause to Senate staffer who leaked Pentagon Papers to media).
72
See Ferejohn, supra note 2.
73
See Stiglitz, supra note 35, at 11-12.
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interest groups know that the legislator knows that the interest groups have no way to
verify the claim; that common knowledge makes the claim noncredible.74
These remarks are general; let us focus concretely on the problem of leaks in
various contexts where we have recommended delayed disclosure. The main challenge
for delayed disclosure, and the main variable that differs across these contexts, is the size
of the group that would have access to the confidential information at the time
transparency could adversely affect deliberations. The fewer people involved in decision
making, the easier it is to detect and prevent leaks. We will begin with those in which
leaks are hardest to prevent and move to those where prevention is less costly.75
Congressional committees. Committees often have large memberships and
substantial staffs, making it unclear whether delayed disclosure is a workable solution
when applied to committee deliberations. Even if only the members of the committee and
their staffs were privy to the details of deliberations, then several dozen, perhaps even
more, people would have to maintain confidentiality in the face of temptations to disclose
the information to interested parties. These parties can entice disclosure through implicit
promises of campaign contributions and other help to lawmakers and through hints of
future employment to staff. Because records of the deliberations would be maintained for
future release, people involved in the negotiations might be able to credibly provide
confidential information to interested parties.
These considerations are hardly decisive, however. For one thing, there are legal
penalties for showing nonpublic records to outside parties, such as interest groups or
journalists, so the would-be leaker faces a dilemma between issuing a credible leak at the
risk of prosecution, and avoiding the risk of prosecution by limiting himself to cheap talk.

74

For a different example of a proposal to reduce disclosure and eliminate the effects of leaks by rendering
them non-credible, see Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, Voting with Dollars: A New Paradigm for Campaign
Finance (2002) (advocating secret donation booth in the campaign finance context to reduce the influence
of special interests). Under their proposal, information could not be credibly provided about donations from
interest groups because donors had the ability to withdraw their donation for a period of time after it was
made, and even a canceled check is not credible evidence of a donation. See id. at 101-02.
75
Because we do not advocate closing floor deliberations from the public at any time – even during
deliberation on concurrent budget resolutions and macro-budgetary policies – we do not discuss the effect
of leaks in this context. Certainly, combating leaks would be more difficult with respect to floor debate
because of the number of people involved – not just lawmakers themselves, but their personal staffs and the
staff of Congress.
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For another, our suggestion is for complete opacity only at the stage of overall allocation
by budget committees developing a budget resolution; at the stage of actual dickering, we
merely propose that disclosure be delayed. At the former stage, the incentive to leak
details to special interest groups is much reduced, because there are fewer details to leak
and because it is less clear how particular interests will be affected by macro-level
allocation. The very condition that makes opacity desirable—that actors work behind a
partial veil of uncertainty—also reduces the benefits to be gained from leaks. At the latter
stage, the incentive to leak is greater, but secrecy need only be temporarily enforced.
Most generally, many congressional committees do manage to maintain secrecy or
opacity for many issues. Absent some further account suggesting special reason to fear
leaks in the budget setting, there is no obvious reason that a regime of committee-level
opacity in budget matters would be systematically infeasible, although occasional leaks
would surely occur.
Budget summits and advisory committees. Here leaks can rather easily be
monitored and deterred; the small number of participants makes it difficult for the leaker
to hide in the crowd. Historically, budget summit participants have usually managed to
keep their deliberations confidential against the threat of internal leaks. Although some
contemporaneous news stories surrounding budget summits include unnamed sources
floating trial balloons or strategically leaking information that harms their opponents,76
the political and fiscal conditions that lead to an interbranch summit are typically serious
enough that participants understand secrecy is in their best interests. Details may become
available some time after the summit as participants write memoirs77 or participate in

76

See David Hoffman & John E. Yang, Bush Repeats ‘No Preconditions’ for Deficit Talks, Wash. Post,
May 11, 1990, at A24 (reporting that White House Chief of Staff John Sununu “told reporters that
Democrats could bring tax increases to the negotiating table but that Bush would not accept them.”
According to the Post, “Sununu spoke on condition he not be identified by name, but yesterday others on
the plane with him identified Sununu as the senior official who made the remarks.”); David S. Broder,
Optimistic Democrats Seek Issues, Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1990, at A8 (quoting comments made by
Democratic Party Chairman Ronald H. Brown that “were based on leaked reports on administration
proposals at the budget summit at Andrews Air Force Base”); Robert Pear, G.O.P. Feud in House Stalls
Budget Talks, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1997, at A15 (quoting a Republican House member speaking on the
condition of anonymity, who said that "[t]he Speaker's negotiating position has been weakened. It will be
more difficult to reach an accord. The Speaker will have a natural hesitancy to take risks with regard to the
more conservative elements of our caucus."); Gilmour, supra note 22, at 159 (quoting very vague
statements made to the press by participants of the 1987 budget summit).
77
See, e.g., Richard Darman, Who’s In Control? Polar Politics and the Sensible Center (1996).
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interviews for analysis in books, magazine articles, or scholarly research.78 But leaks
from these entities are unlikely to be prevalent because enforcement is much less
challenging in the context of small groups.
Overall, the technique of delayed disclosure should be seriously considered as a
way to achieve the goals of traditional disclosure while responding to the concern that
interest groups and lobbyists are the true beneficiaries of open meetings. The strategy is
least likely to work when the group that must keep the secret is so large that it is difficult
to detect who leaks the information, and when the leaks can be accompanied by credible
proof of the information’s accuracy. Small groups such as budget summits and federal
advisory committees should pose little problem; congressional committees are a larger
challenge, but probably not an insuperable one.
Conclusion
Our main emphasis, and the primary aim of the foregoing, has been to
sketch an ideal or first-best framework for transparency in the federal budget process.
The details of the framework are complex, but these are its outlines: less transparency
should obtain at earlier stages of the budget process, when participants are deliberating
over broad goals; more transparency should obtain at later stages, when actors are
dickering over specific programs. In the latter domain, delayed disclosure should be used
where feasible to maximize the benefits of transparency for voters while minimizing its
benefits for interest groups. This framework faces a range of institutional and political
constraints and motivational problems, but these problems are not clearly
insurmountable.
Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Adrian Vermeule
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
avermeul@midway.uchicago.edu
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See, e.g., Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (1994) (providing details of
budget negotiations in 1993); Wildavsky & Caiden, supra note 24, at 137-42 (providing details of dynamics
of 1990 budget summit).
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Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel (October 2003)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight (October 2003)
David A. Weisbach, Corporate Tax Avoidance (January 2004)
David A. Weisbach, The (Non)Taxation of Risk (January 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty versus Property? Cracks in the Foundations of Copyright Law (April 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Eric A. Posner and John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication (February 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Are Poor People Worth Less Than Rich People? Disaggregating the Value of Statistical
Lives (February 2004)
Richard A. Epstein, Disparities and Discrimination in Health Care Coverage; A Critique of the Institute of
Medicine Study (March 2004)
Richard A. Epstein and Bruce N. Kuhlik, Navigating the Anticommons for Pharmaceutical Patents: Steady
the Course on Hatch-Waxman (March 2004)
Richard A. Esptein, The Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules (April 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Persistent Puzzles of Safeguards: Lessons from the Steel Dispute (May 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor within
and between Law Firms (April 2004)
Luis Garicano and Thomas N. Hubbard, Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Knowledge:
Theory and Evidence from the Legal Services Industry (April 2004)
James C. Spindler, Conflict or Credibility: Analyst Conflicts of Interest and the Market for Underwriting
Business (July 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Public International Law (July 2004)
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1/24/2006

Douglas Lichtman and Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable (July 2004)
Shlomo Benartzi, Richard H. Thaler, Stephen P. Utkus, and Cass R. Sunstein, Company Stock, Market
Rationality, and Legal Reform (July 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information Markets (August 2004,
revised October 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions against What? The Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perceptions
(August 2004)
M. Todd Henderson and James C. Spindler, Corporate Heroin: A Defense of Perks (August 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Cyber Security: Of Heterogeneity and Autarky (August 2004)
Randal C. Picker, Unbundling Scope-of-Permission Goods: When Should We Invest in Reducing Entry
Barriers? (September 2004)
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law (September 2004)
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law (2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment (October 2004)
Kenneth W. Dam, Cordell Hull, the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act, and the WTO (October 2004)
Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation (November 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, Is the International Court of Justice Biased? (December 2004)
Alan O. Sykes, Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law: Of Standing and Remedy
(February 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies (March
2005)
Eric A. Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in Contract Law (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Copyright and the DMCA: Market Locks and Technological Contracts (March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The Relevance of Life-Life
Tradeoffs (March 2005)
Alan O. Sykes, Trade Remedy Laws (March 2005)
Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home, and the Duty of Ongoing Design
(March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)
James C. Spindler, IPO Liability and Entrepreneurial Response (May 2005)
Douglas Lichtman, Substitutes for the Doctrine of Equivalents: A Response to Meurer and Nard (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism (May 2005)
Douglas G. Baird, Property, Natural Monopoly, and the Uneasy Legacy of INS v. AP (May 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance
(May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities (July 2005)
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income
Tax (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Arden Rowell, On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and
Ingergenerational Equity (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing: A Consumer’s Guide (July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005)
David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting (August 2005)
Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist Approach (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure (August 2005)
Douglas G. Baird and Donald S. Bernstein, Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization
Bargain (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)
Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is Democracy (September 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Climate Change
(November 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude (November 2005)

40

Budget Transparency

265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.

278.

1/24/2006

Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal, and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005)
Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Total Liability for Excessive Harm (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is (November 2005,
revised January 2006)
Andrew V. Papachristos, Tracey L. Meares, and Jeffrey Fagan, Attention Felons: Evaluating Project Safe
Neighborhoods in Chicago (November 2005)
Lucian A. Bebchuk and Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets
(December 2005)
Kenneth W. Dam, Institutions, History, and Economics Development (January 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, Land, Law and Economic Development (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply (January 2006)
Kenneth W. Dam, China as a Test Case: Is the Rule of Law Essential for Economic Growth (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism (January 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and Prison Population Rates in Empirical
Research on the Relationship between Incarceration and Crime, Unemployment, Poverty, and Other Social
Indicators? On the Continuity of Spatial Exclusion and Confinement in Twentieth Century United States
(January 2006)
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget Process (January 2006)

41

